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Applying Fiduciary Responsibilities in

the Managed Care Context
Peter D. Jacobsont and Michael T. Cahillt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The cost containment innovations offered by managed care have been needed
corrections to the excesses of the fee-for-service health care system.
Yet,
implementing these innovations raises inevitable questions about conflicts of interest
regarding the allocation of resources under managed care. The inherent conflict
faced by physicians and health plan administrators between the health care needs of
individual patients and the need to preserve scarce resources for patient populations
is at issue in the managed care era. The sources of the conflict are the economic
incentives that underlie the managed care revolution, such as capitated funding
arrangements, limitations on referrals to specialists, bonuses and withholds. In
making individual clinical decisions, physicians and administrators potentially infuse
their own economic interests into the process.
An additional complication is the increasing tendency of attorneys and
physicians to view each other as antagonists, making it difficult to formulate policies
to resolve these inherent conflicts.' Historically, law and medicine have been
interdependent professions. 2 In the early nineteenth century, the two professions
cooperated on matters of mutual interest, and there was hope that they could jointly
develop a field of legal medicine. At times, however, especially during the past thirty
years, that interdependence has led to considerable conflict between physicians and
attorneys over the perceived intrusiveness of the legal system into the clinical
domain. The conflict between the two professions has been exacerbated in recent
years with the decline of physician dominance and authority over health care delivery

t Associate Professor, School of Public Health, University of Michigan. Mr. Jacobson benefited
greatly from general discussions with Marc A. Rodwin, J.D., Ph.D., M. Gregg Bloche, M.D., J.D.,
and Susan D. Goold, M.D., though they have neither seen nor commented on this manuscript. The
authors also appreciate insightful comments from Robert W. Geist, M.D., Richard J. Forde, M.D.,
and Daniel Lang, M.D.
t Law Clerk, Honorable James B. Loken, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. B.A.,
Yale, 1993; J.D., M.P.P., University of Michigan, 1999.
1 See Daniel M. Fox, Physicians Versus Lawyers: A Conflict of Cultures, in AIDS AND THE LAW:
A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 210, 210 (Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter AIDS AND THE
LAW].
2

See generally JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993) (discussing the practice of medicine in early America).
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3
and the rise of managed care.
Two basic difficulties underlie nearly all conflicts arising under managed care.
The first is the problem of forming a binding agreement while in a position of
uncertainty regarding the future. At best, it is difficult to specify the future
contingencies of medical care in the language of the health plan agreement. When
medical needs arise, any contractual ambiguities or tensions lurking beneath the
parties' various understandings of the benefit package come to the surface.
The second problem is the reality of scarce resources, which necessitated the
development of the modem managed care regime in the first place. It simply is not
possible to provide health care on demand without regard to cost. Cost containment
is an inevitable feature of health care delivery at the Millennium; the question is not
whether there will be cost containment, but how to structure and oversee the process
of cost coitainment. Neither the courts-to whom patients frequently turn when the
general need for cost containment turns into the specific need to deny treatment-nor
anyone else can successfully resolve managed care disputes by ignoring or wishing
away the fundamental fact of scarcity. The mission facing whoever arbitrates
managed care disputes is to ensure fair, accurate and efficient administration while
also preventing bias or the provision of inadequate care in the name of short-sighted
profiteering.
In this Article we describe a process, based on fiduciary duty principles, for
resolving potential conflicts of interest arising in managed care and for addressing the
mutual antagonism between physicians and attorneys. As Part II of this Article
describes, one current topic of legal debate is whether courts should analyze managed
care issues under the rubric of tort or contract law. Although both tort and contract
are, to some extent, necessary components of a legal regime in managed care, they
are not sufficient either individually or in tandem to resolve the types of conflicts and
disputes presented in managed care.
As an alternative, Part III proposes (detailed more specifically in Part IV) a
regime rooted in the concept of fiduciary duty. 4 A fiduciary-literally, one who is
entrusted with the power to act for the benefit of another-owes a duty of loyalty and
a duty to exercise care in making decisions. 5 Fiduciary relationships are particularly
important in medical care where "the parties are unable to foresee the conditions

3 See Fox, supra note 1,at 211 (observing that "the conflict between physicians and lawyers,
though it is rooted in the modern history of the two professions, has become more intense in recent
years as the authority most people accord to physicians has diminished").
4 Norman Daniels and James Sabin have been developing a similar approach, albeit in a
different context. See generally Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in
Managed Care Reform, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 1998, at 50 (discussing a movement in managed care
reform to increase accountability to consumers); Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance
Therapies and Managed Care: Pluralism, FairProcedures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 27 (discussing how greater fairness in the decision-making process is needed
when health plans are expanding experimental and last chance procedures); Norman Daniels & James
E. Sabin, Limits to Health Care: Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy
Problem for Insurers, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1997) (discussing the shift of authority over
medical care from the patients to private organizations).
5See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991); see also Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care
Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 365 (1990) (discussing the rules of fiduciary contracting); Marc
A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a

Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 242 (1995) (examining the "metaphor of
physicians as fiduciaries").
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under which one act produces better results than another," 6 aid where the parties lack
adequate information to assess the quality of care.
The underlying justification for using the fiduciary duty model is that a patient's
trust in his or her physician is the foundation of a morally acceptable health care
system. Patients expect and trust that physicians have control over the resources
needed for their care. 7 Many aspects of this relationship of trust-including methods
of balancing social and economic concerns and the aspects of a physician's
relationship to the managed care plan that must be disclosed to patients-are subjects
of intense dispute. 8 The basic need for trust, though, is incontrovertible. Absent
trust, managed care cannot survive.
A fiduciary model offers a framework that preserves patient trust while
recognizing that changes in the marketplace, including economic incentives to limit
the use of health care resources, are unavoidable, at least in the short-term. Part V
concludes with a discussion of law and medicine at the Millennium, focusing on why
the fiduciary approach can help resolve the tensions unsettling health care delivery.
II.

THE TORT VS. CONTRACT DEBATE 9

In the fee-for-service system, disputes regarding a patient's insurance coverage
were governed by contract law. Disputes regarding the care the patient received from
a provider were governed by tort law and focused on whether the provider had
satisfied the standard of care. Contract analysis emphasizes that the parties have
entered into an agreement and attempts to explain how that earlier agreement bears
on the present situation; the contract model adopts an ex ante, pre-dispute
perspective. Tort, on the other hand, examines the situation from the ex post
perspective, highlighting the fact that the circumstances of a subsequent dispute
usually could not have been anticipated when the parties formed the plan.
In the new managed care model, the insurance and health care delivery functions
combine into one entity. This changes the litigation context in several ways. With
the integration of financing and health care delivery, refusing coverage means
denying care altogether. In their capacity as insurers, managed care organizations
(MCOs) may deny health care recommended by the patient's physician or may only
agree to provide limited funding for certain clinical interventions. If the patient
suffers an adverse outcome as a result of this decision, which legal regime should
govern the subsequent legal claim-tort or contract? Although contract-based
solutions have greatly predominated, each legal rule has its adherents in the literature.

6 Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1048.
7See David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical
Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 661, 669 (1998).
8 See generally CLARK C. HAVIGHURST,

HEALTH CARE CHOICES:

PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS

INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (1995) (arguing that private contracts can be used to specify
the legal rights of patients in relation to health care providers); MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE,
MONEY, AND MORALS (1993) (examining the relationship between professional ethics and economic
interests in determining medical behavior); M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Loyalties and the Social
Purposes of Medicine, 281 JAMA 268 (1999) (reviewing the conflicts between the ethic of "loyalty
to patients and pressure to use clinical methods and judgment for social purposes and on behalf of
third parties"); Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, Ethical Practice in Managed Care: A Dose of
Realism, 128 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 395 (1998) (examining the ethics of medical practice under
managed care).
9 This section is adapted from Peter D. Jacobson & Neena M. Patil, Managed Care Litigation:
Legal Doctrine at the Boundary of Contract and Tort (unpublished manuscript, on file at Medical
Care Research and Review).
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Both regimes have features that address, and comport well with, certain aspects of
managed care.' 0
The basic case for contract is that the market will provide the type and level of
choices that consumers want. For Clark Havighurst and other contract proponents,I
the rationale for the primacy of contract is that consumers can directly exercise
As an instrument of market
sovereignty over cost, quality and service.1 2
arrangements, contractual freedom will force health care providers to compete on
both price and quality to retain customers. Paul Rubin notes that purchasers have an
incentive to choose an efficient plan, defined as "one that provides all cost-justified
care and no more,"' 13 and that contracts allow individuals to decide how much they
desire to spend on health care relative to other commodities.1 4 Contract proponents
also argue that contracting shifts the responsibility of health care decisions back to
the patient where it belongs. I5
The most powerful argument against the contract perspective in health care is
the absence of adequate patient information. Unlike most consumer contracts, where
the consumer can anticipate his or her needs and assess the costs of the product being
purchased, most patients cannot anticipate their future medical needs when the
contract is signed.1 6 It is difficult for patients to comprehend the potential risks and
to bargain over them in advance. By definition, medical error is an accidental
byproduct of the provider-patient relationship. The combination of "lack of
information, inability to evaluate risk, and the inequality of bargaining power" is a
powerful rejoinder to the pro-contract viewpoint.' 7 The contractarian case assumes a
separation between benefit decisions, traditionally a matter for contract
interpretation, and medical treatment decisions, traditionally overseen by tort law's
standard of care. In fact, most of the litigated cases depend on individual clinical
decisions that are rarely influenced by the terms of the contract.'8 Since these clinical
decisions do not usually depend on interpretations of available benefits, contract law
may have little to say about how they are resolved.
Many advocates of a contract-based system have thoroughly presented the case
against tort. In brief, these commentators believe that the tort system is inefficient
and random in providing compensation, has very high administrative costs, does not
deter wrongdoing, sets standards of care too high and provides benefits that
consumers would generally not be willing to pay for in the market. These advocates
argue that tort awards increase the cost of health care without providing
10See Peter D. Jacobson, Legal Challenges to Managed Care Cost Containment Programs: An
Initial Assessment, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 69, 76-83.
1I See HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 1-10; Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefieldfor
Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 492 (1997) (noting that various experiments offering lowcost, low-benefit plans have not succeeded in the market).
12 See HAVIGHURST, supra note 8, at 1-10.
13Paul H. Rubin, Treatment Decisions: Tort or Contract?, REGULATION, Winter 1999, at 25,
27.
14 See id.
Is See E. Haavi Morreim, Moral Justice and Legal Justice in Managed Care: The Ascent of
Contributive Justice, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 247, 256-58 (1995).
16See Catherine G. McLaughlin & Paul B. Ginsburg, Competition, Quality of Care, and the
Role of the Consumer, 76 MILBANK Q. 737, 739 (1998) (stating that consumers lack the information
and knowledge to judge the quality of services).
17 P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, 49 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 286, 295 (1986).
18See Jacobson & Patil, supra note 9.
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commensurate benefits.19
Both the tort and contract regimes have considerable shortcomings in terms of
their conceptual or practical ability to handle the conflicts posed by managed care.
Although particular aspects of managed care seem to resemble contract-governed or
tort-governed activities, "[i]t is becoming impossible to characterize components of
managed care as wholly contractual or wholly tort, which makes it quite difficult to
determine which body of law governs." 20 As a result, the tort-contract debate is a
dead end in addressing managed care's potential conflicts.
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE-FIDUCIARY DUTY
Since both tort and contract appear to be inadequate as methods for resolving
potential conflicts between an individual patient and an MCO's patient population, 21
we need to develop alternative approaches. 22 The concept of fiduciary duty is one
option for resolving such disputes. One reason is that the fiduciary model is already
part of the managed care decision-making process through the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).23 ERISA recognizes that individual clinical
decisions may sometimes be made in the context of a potential conflict with the goal
of preserving assets for the managed care patient population. This section sketches
the contours of the fiduciary approach and describes its relation to the legal
framework created by ERISA.
A. THE FIDUCIARY APPROACH
The fiduciary model delegates decision-making power to an impartial authority,
called the fiduciary, to resolve conflicts arising between patient care for a single
patient and the costs of that care to the plan as a whole. 24 We will refer to the
"impartial" fiduciary as the plan fiduciary to distinguish him or her from individual
physicians who also have a fiduciary relationship with their own patients. The plan
fiduciary will bear responsibility for balancing the needs and interests of the patients
who receive care, the insurers who pay for care, and the physicians who provide care.
While information problems commonly prevent patients from making proper risk
19 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?

382-83 (1997); Danzon, supra note I1,at 518-19; Clark C. Havighurst, Making Health Plans
Accountable for the Quality of Care, 31 GA. L. REV. 587, 645-46 (1997); George L. Priest, The
Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1525 (1987); Rubin, supra note
13, at 29-30. The evidence that tort law actually increases health care costs is sparse. Atiyah argues
that the proper response is to reform the tort system and not allow contracting for lower than
reasonable standards of care. See Atiyah, supra note 17, at 287-303.
20 Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts: Distinguishing Patient
Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y, Fall 1998, at I,
27.
21 See William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care
Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 6 (1994) (illustrating the tension between the individual
patient's well-being and the general population's well-being).
22 Some scholars have proposed strategies that would bridge tort and contract. For example,
Havighurst and Sage argue that enterprise liability is most appropriate, while Brewbaker argues in
favor of a breach of warranty standard. See Havighurst, supra note 19, at 587; Sage et al., supra note
21, at 1-2. But see HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: MANAGED CARE § 6.2.5.2 (Mark A. Hall &
William S. Brewbaker, IIIeds., 1996) (discussing. theories of managed care liability, including
contractual obligations. For example, some courts will find that the insurer breached an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing). In addition, Mariner and Morreim propose standards that
would combine elements of tort and contract. For details, see Jacobson & Patil, supra note 9.
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).
24 See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 5, at 1046.

160

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 26 NOS. 2&3 2000

calculations, and individual providers are unable to assess the impact of specific care
decisions on the overall costs of a plan, a plan fiduciary is perfectly poised to make
whatever tradeoffs are necessary between care and the cost of care. The United
States Supreme Court has noted that the central purpose of fiduciary law is to govern
the exercise of discretion in making decisions that are not, and cannot be, controlled
in advance by legal means. 25
A fiduciary relationship imposes two fundamental duties on the fiduciary: the
duty to exercise prudence 26 and the duty of loyalty. 27 Courts can resolve conflicts
regarding managed care decisions by focusing on whether the plan fiduciary has
upheld these two duties. Both of these duties relate to process rather than outcome in
that a court will not substitute its judgment for the fiduciary's where there is no
showing of a failure to exercise good judgment or that an improper motivation lurks
28
behind that decision.
The duty of prudence, often ignored in health care cases discussing fiduciary
duty, requires that the fiduciary exercise reasonable care and skill in making
decisions affecting beneficiaries. 2 9 Possession or an express claim of greater-thannormal skill or judgment will raise the threshold of prudence a fiduciary must
satisfy. 30 Any challenge to the plan fiduciary's decision to deny care would need to
assert a breach of this duty.
The duty of loyalty demands that the fiduciary not have any conflicting loyalties
that might influence his or her ability to make decisions in the beneficiaries' best
interests) 1 In the managed care context, some might assume that this prohibition on
conflicts would foreclose the creation of incentives to curtail costs, as these might be
thought to encourage disloyalty to specific patients. The approach articulated here
assumes the continued use of incentives, and does not oppose them. To the contrary,
traditional medical ethics place the physician-patient relationship at the center of the
clinical encounter, not at the periphery. While incentives will inevitably pose
conflicts between individual patients and the patient population, the physician's
initial loyalty and fiduciary duty is owed to the individual patient. 32
Thus, there is a need for a feasible set of fiduciary duties and standards for
physicians and managed care organizations that explicitly recognizes the tensions
involved in simultaneously serving the patient and the patient population. Although
both realms of fiduciary duties are important, this Article focuses on the plan
fiduciary as the usual decision maker. The fiduciary framework offers a means of
resolving patient-population conflicts without undermining the legitimate policy
objectives of controlling health care costs or the physician's fiduciary duty to his
patients. Fiduciary law contemplates that fiduciaries may need to balance competing

25 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996) ("Indeed, the primary function of the
fiduciary duty is to constrain the exercise of discretionary powers which are controlled by no other
specific duty imposed by the trust instrument or the legal regime.").
26 See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 334 (6th ed. 1987).
27
See id. at 341.

28 See id. at 336; see also id. at 334-35, 342 (stating that the lack of good judgment or improper
motivation triggers a breach of fiduciary duty).
29 See id. at 335.
30 See id. at 335-36 n.17.
31 See id. at 341.
32 Cf William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 1529 (1999) (presenting
a case for doctors providing lawyer-like advocacy).
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interests (such as corporate officers serving multiple constituencies). 33 In most cases
involving denial of care, the correct analysis with respect to the duty of loyalty is not
to ask whether the plan fiduciary has any inherent conflicts or broad incentives to
minimize costs generally. Instead, the issue is whether a decision in the specific case
at hand was in fact motivated by an improper conflict of interest that interfered with
sound clinical judgment.
Numerous disputes regarding the plan fiduciary's satisfaction of the two duties
described above arise in managed care. For example, one frequent source of
litigation is the common provision that a plan will cover care deemed medically
necessary. 34 This provision is devoid of meaning until it is applied to the medical
needs of a specific patient with a specific condition. 35 As described below, this
framework attempts to define who should decide what is medically necessary, how
the fiduciary should make that decision, and what role the court system would play in
reviewing that decision. Another common dispute revolves around the fact that many
plans include policies restricting the use of procedures that, although they may
provide substantial benefits for certain patients, have substantial costs that would
exceed their benefits if made available to all patients. 36 One such procedure is the
injection of more costly contrast agents for radiological procedures that provide
significant benefits to high-risk groups but whose benefits do not justify the cost of
using them for every injection. 37 The plan fiduciary would be responsible for
determining whether the particular patient was sufficiently high-risk to justify the
more expensive procedure despite the general plan policy restricting its use.
One way to give a broad sense of what a fiduciary model would entail is to
briefly sketch how it would differ from the traditional contract and tort views. Unlike
the ex ante contract perspective, the fiduciary model acknowledges the specific
clinical choices involved in benefit decisions. Instead of asking the courts to apply
ambiguous contract terms to a complex clinical determination, the fiduciary model
would examine what factors the plan fiduciary considered in his or her decision. In
contrast to the tort model's focus on causation and damages in an individual case, this
model evaluates the integrity of the process governing how decisions are made and
whether the challenged decision complied with that process. Instead of considering
the standard of care an individual provider owes an individual patient, this model
considers the standard of care (or prudence) the MCO as an institution owes to both
individual patients and the total pool of plan subscribers. Simultaneously, it is more
efficient and less costly than a tort-based regime because private agents, rather than
the courts, would be making decisions in the first instance. And where the terms
"tort" and "contract" frequently amount to little more than reductive viewpoints that
systematically favor individual patients and MCOs, respectively, the fiduciary model

33 See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and
Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 256 (1995) ("[T]he fact
that physicians have obligations to third parties does not mean that they cannot be fiduciaries for
patients. Obligations to third parties may merely limit the scope of fiduciary obligation ....").
34 See, e.g., McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 137 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a decision to deny benefits is arbitrary and capricious if it is not a reasonable
interpretation of the plan's terms).
35 See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson et al., Defining and Implementing Medical Necessity in
Washington State and Oregon, 34 INQUIRY 143, 143 (1997).
36 See Jacobson, supra note 10, at 69-70.
37 See Peter D. Jacobson & C.J. Rosenquist, The Introduction of Low-Osmolar ContrastAgents
in Radiology: Medical. Economic, Legal and Public Policy Issues, 260 JAMA 1586, 1586 (1988).
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38
contains no internal bias for or against the provision of care in specific cases.
39
B. ERISA's FIDUCIARY RULES

The concept of using fiduciary duties to make tradeoffs between individual
beneficiaries and plan populations is hardly novel. Indeed, in the managed care
environment, the need to balance competing interests is explicitly contemplated under
ERISA,40 which governs most employer-provided health plans. ERISA imposes a
fiduciary duty requiring those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of an
employee benefit plan to act "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries" of the plan.4 1 Unfortunately, these terms are not defined either by
ERISA or by the courts. 42 Neither ERISA nor the courts are clear about which
decisions are discretionary or made on behalf of the plan. Courts have held in many
cases that MCOs are subject to this fiduciary duty when making certain decisions,
43
such as reviewing the appropriateness of a physician's treatment recommendations.
In exercising this fiduciary duty, one obvious problem the administrator faces is that
the plan's participants may not share a single interest; the clinical needs of one
patient may conflict with the MCO's economic interests or the interests of other
44
members of the patient population.
To determine whether an MCO breached its fiduciary duty when denying plan
benefits, courts employ different levels of scrutiny based on the amount of discretion
granted to the MCO under the employee benefits plan (EBP). Generally, courts are
very deferential, upholding the plan administrator's decision as long as it was not
arbitrary and capricious. 45 This deference is in part due to the recognition that the
plan administrator also owes a fiduciary duty to maintain plan assets for other
participants. 46 Courts have most often equated compliance with the terms of the EBP
as, by definition, acting "in the interest" of the plan participant. 47 In doing so, courts
limit their review to ensuring that the MCO reasonably comported with the terms of

38 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996).
[A] fiduciary obligation, enforceable by fiduciaries seeking relief for themselves, does
not necessarily favor payment over nonpayment. The common law of trusts recognizes
the need to preserve assets to satisfy future, as well as present, claims and requires a
trustee to take impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries.
Id.
39 This section is adapted from Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and
Physician Autonomy, 283 JAMA 921, 921-26 (2000).
4029 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1999).
41 Id. § I104(a)(I).
42 See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts:
Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence,35 HOUSTON L. REV. 985, 987 (1998); E.
Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans: Diminishing Deference to Fiduciaries and an
Emerging Problemfor Provider-SponsoredOrganizations, 65 TENN. L. REV. 511, 512 (1998).
43 See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Kyle
Railways, Inc. v. Pacific Administration Servs., 990 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1993). It is agreed
that MCOs and employers are not considered fiduciaries with regard to establishing or changing the
terms of the plan. See id.
44 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 107-08 (1989).
45 See McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1253, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998); Morreim, supra
note 42, at 520.
46 See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Necessity,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1669 n.124 (1992).
47 See, e.g., Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 491 (3d Cir. 2000); Seales v. Amoco
Corp., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
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the EBP. 48 As a result, MCOs retain power vis-A-vis physicians by controlling the
interpretation of EBP terms. 49 But in a case where the plan profits directly from the
denial, the potential conflict of interest must be considered as a factor in deciding
whether there was an abuse of the fiduciary's discretion.50
To date, courts have not defined the meaning of ERISA's fiduciary duty
provision. For the most part, they have understood this duty only as a mandate that
plan administrators avoid improper financial incentives. The precise rules governing
which institutional financial structures are acceptable and which are not acceptable
remain opaque, as do the standards for making tradeoffs between patients and the
plan in individual cases. A more robust understanding of fiduciary duties is needed
to address these concerns. We offer and defend such a definitive scheme in the
following Part.
IV. THE FIDUCIARY FRAMEWORK
The fiduciary model arises from the possibilities and limitations available to the
parties as they contract to form a plan. While the parties cannot decide costallocation issues in advance, they can decide who will decide. In other words, they
can vest someone (the plan fiduciary) with decision-making authority and with
concomitant responsibilities, including the duties to be prudent and loyal to the
participants' interests. Indeed, most managed care plans do name administrators
whose function is to make determinations regarding matters at the intersection of the
management and care components of managed care. A managed care model centered
on the organizing principle of fiduciary duty must address three sets of issues: (1) the
proper structure for selection and oversight of the fiduciary; (2) the actual decision
rules that will govern the fiduciary's exercise of his authority; and (3) the role of the
legal system in adjudicating disputes with respect to the fiduciary's decisions.
A. STRUCTURAL ISSUES
The first concerns are structuraland relate to the plan's internal mechanisms to
ensure proper decisions by the fiduciary. Because a fiduciary is by definition a figure
in a position of trust, institutional safeguards must assure that the fiduciary will be
trustworthy. These safeguards take two forms: constraints on who may serve as a
fiduciary and disclosure to plan participants of relevant information about the
fiduciary. 5' The plan participants must consent to the organizational structure that
establishes and monitors the fiduciary because the fiduciary is ultimately accountable
to insureds as well as payors.
1. Selecting the Fiduciary
One fundamental question that this framework must answer, and that courts have
struggled to answer, is who constitutes a fiduciary in managed care. 52 Broadly
defined, whoever exercises discretion in determining when and whether to approve

48 See England v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 846 F. Supp. 798, 801 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
49 See, e.g., Hall & Anderson, supra note 46, at 1670.
50
See Killian v. Healthsource Provident Administrators, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir.
1998).
51 Another safeguard, ex post oversight of the fiduciary's decisions, is legal rather than
structural in nature and is discussed infra Part IV.C.
52 That issue is central to the Supreme Court's upcoming consideration of Herdrich v. Pegram,
154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 170 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct.
10(1999).

164

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 26 NOS. 2&3 2000

medical intervention is acting in a fiduciary capacity.5 3 Thus, either a physician or a
plan administrator can act as a fiduciary if the plan delegates discretionary decisionmaking authority to them.
The common law duty of loyalty demands the selection of a plan fiduciary with
no conflicting interests that would prevent him or her from making unbiased
decisions in the beneficiaries' best interests. 54 The identification of truly relevant
conflicts is more difficult than it may first appear. It is difficult to distinguish
decisions motivated by conflicting loyalties from good-faith efforts to control costs in
accordance with the managed care objective. Acts undertaken to benefit the plan as a
whole (i.e., to reduce costs and, therefore, the premium owed by each plan
participant) often look the same as acts undertaken to benefit the managed care
55
corporate entity (i.e., to increase profits and make shareholders wealthier).
Ultimately, the insureds under the plan also have a decided interest in holding down
costs to ensure the plan's economic viability and efficient operation. In a competitive
marketplace, lower costs will result in reduced premiums or expanded benefits. At
the same time, if subscribers express the desire to pay more in return for receiving
more benefits, the fiduciary will have no incentive to deny care arbitrarily, because
the plan participants will replace him or her with someone more responsive to their
wishes. The question is not whether there are any conflicts at all, but rather what
kinds of conflicting loyalties or responsibilities are acceptable, what kinds are not,
and how they will be resolved.
Not all courts reviewing decisions by managed care plan administrators have
understood the intimate connection between the financial interests of the corporation
and those of the plan participants. Courts sometimes find conflicting loyalties
improper where there are only conflicting obligations to multiple beneficiaries. By
definition, conflicting obligations are inevitable under managed care because
resources spent for one patient are not available for another, but these are not
necessarily the types of conflicts that would violate fiduciary duty. 56 For example, in
the recent case of Herdrich v. Pegram,57 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit comes close to adopting a per se conflict of interest rule against managed
care's use of financial incentives where parties with the power to make decisions
about care have any direct stake in the MCO's financial performance. Judge
Easterbrook, dissenting from the denial of a rehearing of the case before the full
court, pointed out that if the defendant's structure violated fiduciary duties, "then all
managed care does so, because the allegations in the complaint narrate mundane
features of health maintenance organizations." ' 58 The proper objective of the loyalty
rule is to eliminate systematic bias and deter misconduct rather than to aid particular
patients after the fact. 59
53 See Clifford A. Cantor, Fiduciary Liability in Emerging Health Care, 9 DEPAUL BUS. L.
189, 190 (1997).
54 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996).
55Cf. Hall & Anderson, supra note 46, at 1669 ("[T]he only conflict the [self-insuring]
employer faces is that between a single claimant and a pool of beneficiaries, the very conflict that
should be foremost in the insurer's mind when assessing medical appropriateness.").
56 See Morreim, supra note 42, at 524-28 (1998).
57 154 F.3d 362.
58 Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane).
59 See BOGERT, supra note 26, at 343 n. I.
In applying the loyalty rule the court of equity is not primarily concerned in preventing
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Conversely, some courts have recognized that efforts to lower costs often can be
interpreted either as useful attempts to benefit participants or as nefarious schemes to
increase corporate profits, and have correctly suggested that the standard of review
should depend on the extent to which a clear ulterior profit-making motive is present.
For example, the court in McGraw v. PrudentialIns. Co.60 noted that "the degree of
deference to accord [a fiduciary's] decision will be decreased on a sliding scale in
proportion to the extent of conflict present," 6 1 recognizing the need for flexibility
...
62 The
given that "every exercise of discretion impacts [the MCO] financially.
focus on the fiduciary's general relation to the MCO is misplaced because the
conflicts the courts identify are unavoidable. An inquiry directly devoted to
examining the justifications behind specific administrative decisions is more
63
appropriate.
2.
Informing Plan Participants
Arguably, some courts have defined the organizational structures that will create
inherent conflicts of interest for the plan fiduciary too broadly. However, this does
not mean the courts' role in overseeing potential conflicts should be diminished, only
that it should be redirected. Courts should carefully examine whether the plan
participants had proper notice regarding the identity and other relevant characteristics
of the plan fiduciary when they entered the plan. 64 The fiduciary model presupposes
that all parties to the managed care plan have voluntarily ceded decision-making
authority to the fiduciary. As is generally the case in the law governing fiduciary
relationships-for example, with respect to attorney-client relationships and trusteebeneficiary relationships-even where there is only an appearance or likelihood of
conflict, it is critical that conflicts be disclosed.
The courts have given this issue increasing attention. In Neade v. Portes,65 an
Illinois appeals court held that an individual doctor could breach his fiduciary duty
for failing to disclose to patients the nature of his financial relationship to the MCO
and the incentives that relationship created. The court noted that "there is a potential
conflict of interest, which the physician should disclose, where, incompatibly with the
66
patient's interest, he has a financial interest in minimizing referrals or tests."
Although the Neade court broke new ground in requiring individual providers to
disclose their financial interests, the underlying premise of disclosure is not novel.
As Neade recognized, earlier cases had discussed the fiduciary duty of a plan, as
opposed to an individual provider, to disclose information about its financial
structure. One such case is Shea v. Esensten, 67 in which the Eighth Circuit noted that
unjust enrichment and working out the equities of the parties in the individual case....
It is principally desirous of procuring a result which will keep all trustees out of
temptation and thus conduce to the ethical and efficient administration of trusts.
Id.
60 137 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1998).
61 Id. at 1258.
62 Id. at 1259.

For a discussion of this issue at greater length see infra section IV.C.
63 See supra Part III.B.
64 A full discussion of disclosure is beyond the scope of this article. For such a discussion, see
generally William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999). See also Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed
Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 516-20 (1997).
App. 2d 1999).
65 710 N.E.2d 418 (111.
66 Id. at 427.

67 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
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"[t]he duty to disclose material information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility.
".68

B.

DECISION RULES

A second set of issues relates to the substantive decision rules the fiduciary will
employ to resolve disputes. How a conflict of interest will be determined and under
what circumstances a fiduciary breaches the duty of loyalty are among the questions
to be addressed. Decision rules take two forms: general administrative decisions
applied ex ante and specific care decisions applied ex post. These categories mirror
the two types of fiduciary decisions. First, there must be a set of policy rules,
specified in advance of specific care situations, that satisfy the general cost-benefit
analysis managed care seeks to impose on spending decisions. For example, rules
can be established to impose caps or outright prohibitions on types of care known to
be marginally beneficial. Given the frequent need for adaptation in the face of
changing technology, such rules will not be easy to draft and implement. Second,
there must also be care standards that are more flexible and help the fiduciary make
individualized determinations with respect to particular patients. For instance, the
fiduciary may be called on to decide whether a particular form of care is medically
necessary for a given patient. It will be impossible to create rules in advance to
govern these decisions because they will depend on the facts of specific cases.
Instead, the task will be to generate guidelines or principles that will assist the
fiduciary in making a determination.
1. Policy Rules
Most general statements of plan policy that can be specified in advance will be
expressed in the plan contract itself. The fiduciary's role with respect to policy rules
will be limited to a small group of issues for which a blanket provision is appropriate,
but that could not have been addressed at the time the plan was adopted. For
example, as technology develops or prices change with respect to cutting-edge or
only marginally beneficial procedures, the fiduciary's authority will include the
power to create general rules governing the application of new procedures, or to
modify existing rules to reflect the changing reality. Of course, even these rules can
be overruled through modification of the plan's terms when the plan is renewed.
Additionally, because the fiduciary will be directly accountable for the rules he
creates, it will be in his or her interest to exercise discretion. Hard and fast rules will
be created only where the proper course seems clear. For all of these reasons, the
plan fiduciary will probably not create many policy rules.
With the potential exception of challenges to denials of life-saving
interventions, few subscribers are likely to challenge clear benefit limitations
appearing in the plan document. However, subscribers are likely to challenge benefit
denials as applied to specific situations. A benefit limiting inpatient hospital stays to
thirty days may not be contested until the plan fiduciary requires a hospital discharge
after, for example, eight days, despite a physician's request for additional days. 69 In
such a case, it is not the benefit itself but the fiduciary's response to the physician's
request that is interpretation of the rule that is subject to review.
68 Id. at 628 (quoting Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
69 Cf Muse v. Charter Hosp. of Winston-Salem, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a "hospital has the duty not to institute policies ... which interfere with the doctor's
medical judgement.").
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2.

Care Standards
A more significant and complex set of rules governs decisions that relate not to
general plan administration, but to individualized choices about the level of care to
be afforded a given patient in specific circumstances. The question to address is:
what is the scope of a fiduciary's authority to make or review these decisions?
Alternatively, what must a fiduciary do, or prove, to make the decisions binding and
authoritative? For the decisions to have weight and survive scrutiny, the fiduciary
must meet a minimum threshold in two respects. First, before coming to a decision,
he or she must gather and analyze sufficient information to make a reasoned
judgment. Second, after the decision, the fiduciary must be able to articulate
objectively the bases for that decision. Most importantly, these decisions must be
publicly accessible and transparent. 70 It is critical that the fiduciary provide fair
process to benefit denials. As the court stated in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
"[flair procedure comes into play where private organizations are 'tinged with public
stature or purpose' or attain a 'quasi-public significance'... ."71 Fair procedures, the
72
court added, must protect individuals from arbitrary decisions.
We suggest a two-part test for evaluating a fiduciary's decision to deny care.
First, the fiduciary must have a medical reason for denying the intervention or service
to prove that he has satisfied the duty to exercise prudence in making decisions
affecting the patient. That reason must find support in clinical practice guidelines,
the current standard of care, well-defined benefit exclusions, the medical literature, or
in some other practice justification.
Further, that justification must be
reasonablegiven the facts of the case at hand, and because the duty of prudence
embraces an "element of initiative or effort," 73 it must be clear that the fiduciary was
74
familiar with all facts necessary to arrive at a proper medical decision.
Second, the fiduciary must have an administrative reason for the decision in
defend against a claim that a determination breached the duty of loyalty. The
fiduciary must indicate a concomitant benefit to the patient population that justifies
the harm to the individual patient in the case at hand. To borrow the language of
ERISA, the plan fiduciary's responsibility in each instance is to make decisions
"solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan. 75 The
fiduciary must not be serving only personal or corporate ends. There are many tools
the fiduciary might use, including cost-benefit or cost-effective analyses to
demonstrate an appropriate administration reason.

70 See generally articles cited supra note 4 (offering an extended analysis).
71 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 207 (1997) (quoting Delta Dental Plan v. Banasky, 27 Cal. App. 4th
1598, 1607 (1994)), aff'd, 2000 LEXIS 3717 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2000).
72 See id. at 208-09.
73 See BOGERT, supra note 26, at 335; M. Gregg Bloche, Fidelity and Deceit at the Bedside,
283 JAMA 1881, 1881-84 (2000).
74 For an example of a case where a court decided, rightly in our view, that no such medical
justification supported the decision to deny care, see McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1253
(10th Cir. 1998). In McGraw, the medical director charged with reviewing the decision to deny
coverage did not even undertake to review the patient's medical records. Relying in part on this
"egregious" failure, the court found the ultimate decision to deny coverage to be arbitrary and
capricious. See id. at 1262-63. Under our model, the failure to review medical records would
automatically preclude any ability to show a medical justification for the decision at the time the
decision was made and would therefore amount to a per se breach of fiduciary duty.
75
29 U.S.C § 1104 (1994).
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LEGAL ISSUES

The third set of concerns is explicitly legal, and again embraces two central
issues. First, what will be the role of the courts in overseeing institutional structure,
policy rules and specific decisions? Second, what legal remedies will be available to
plan participants who successfully challenge a fiduciary's decision in a particular
case?
1. Standard of Review
The two-part standard previously described, requiring both a medical and an
administrative reason for the denial of care, takes on meaning only when one
addresses the proper judicial standard of review of those justifications. Because the
courts will be applying these standards and assessing the sufficiency of the reasons,
what counts as a sufficient basis for the fiduciary's decision is not to be defined in
terms of abstract principles or goals, but rather in terms of evidentiary requirements
and the level of scrutiny the courts will apply to the fiduciary's decision. The task is
not to decide what might make a fiduciary's decision right or wrong in the abstract,
but to determine what will make a fiduciary's decision survive judicial review. In
short, who has the burden of proof, and when is that burden met?
It is clear that some deference is due to the fiduciary's decision under the
common law model of fiduciary duty. 76 Yet the court must also retain sufficient
oversight to assure that the fiduciary's specific decision was not violative of the
duties of prudence or loyalty, or compromised due to conflicted interests. This is
part of the courts' institutional role. With respect to both elements of our standard
(medical basis and population benefit), the burden should be on the fiduciary to
justify the denial. But how is the fiduciary to meet that burden? One recent
argument asserts that the health plan should have to present clear and convincing
evidence (using clinical practice guidelines, perhaps) that the plaintiffs desired
procedure is not appropriate in order to surmount a claim based on medical
necessity. 77 This burden seems too stringent, although other suggestions-such as
those put forward by E. Haavi Morreim, 78 Mark Hall and Gerald Anderson79-seem
too deferential to the managed care decisionmaker.
The level of deference with which a court reviews the fiduciary's decision
should vary according to the nature and circumstances of the decision. The basic
factor determining the level of scrutiny a court should apply to the fiduciary's
decision is the extent to which the medical and administrative aspects of the decision
are "inextricably intertwined." 80 The threshold issue a court will confront before
76 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989).
[C]haracterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary duty does not necessarily
change the standard a court would apply when reviewing the administrator's decision to
deny benefits. After all, Firestone, which authorized deferential court review when the
plan itself gives the administrator discretionary authority, based its decision upon the
same common-law trust doctrines that govern standards of fiduciary conduct.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514-15 (1996).
77 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care is Medically
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J.MED. 229, 232 (1999).
78 See Morreim, supra note 42, at 551-52.
79 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 46, at 1698-1705.
80 This phrase has been used as a legal term of art in a variety of situations. See, e.g., Swint v.
Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328, 345 (1990). In the context of ERISA preemption of state law claims, courts have held
that the "essential inquiry" is whether allegedly negligent medical advice or care was inextricably
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applying the two-part standard above (medical basis and population benefit) is the
extent to which the decision necessitates a tradeoff between the competing claims and
needs of the patient and the plan. The more a given decision implicates both the
administration of the plan and the practice of medicine, the more evidence the
fiduciary must show to demonstrate that these goals legitimately have been balanced,
i.e., to show that the decision was motivated by good faith.
One way to demonstrate the decision's legitimacy is to provide a medical reason
for the denial that would apply even if the decision were not intertwined. Thus, if the
decision meets the first element of our test to such an extent that it satisfies not only
the fiduciary duty of prudence but the stricter tort standard of care, the decision is
clearly sound.
If such a clear medical justification is not present, the fiduciary must show that
the medical needs of the individual patient remained a central concern and were not
automatically sacrificed. The key evidentiary question is how much of a showing is
necessary to demonstrate the fiduciary's decision-making rationale?
We propose an approach similar to the active rational-basis test employed in
constitutional law.81 The rational-basis test is used to determine the constitutionality
of legislation. 82 Under the rational-basis test, courts will uphold a state's economic
and social legislation as long as it serves any reasonable state interest.8 3 But in an
active rational-basis analysis, courts require states to provide additional justification
for the legislation.8 4 Applying this to the fiduciary context, the fiduciary must
demonstrate the objective existence of a plausible medical reason and offer some
showing that this justification actually motivated the decision. Merely stating that the
care should be denied or that providing care would adversely affect the patient
population would not fulfill the fiduciary's obligations. Importantly, as with review
of agency determinations in administrative law, the fiduciary should not be allowed
merely to provide the courts with a "post-hoc rationalization" generated after
litigation has commenced, but is responsible for generating a contemporaneous
record providing the basis for denial that existed at the time of rejection.8 5 In fact,
such an ongoing record could provide a set of precedents to guide future cases and
ensure consistency. It would also make plan decisions explicit so they could be
subsequently superseded by contract renewal terms.
When medicine and administration are not intertwined, there would be no
deference due to the fiduciary's decision. In fact, there would not even be a proper
intertwined with administration of plan benefits. See, e.g., Schmid v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan,
963 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (D. Or. 1997). Thus here, as elsewhere, there is a rough correlation
(though by no means congruence) between our fiduciary analysis and the ERISA regime.
81 As Hall and Anderson note, models of judicial review based on fiduciary duties share
similarities with models of review under administrative law, constitutional law and the law of
arbitration. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 46, at 1696 (noting that fiduciary, administrative and
arbitration models of judicial review are "somewhat competing and somewhat overlapping"). Space
constraints prevent a thorough analysis of the similarities and differences of the results under our
proposed standard of review as opposed to these other models, but we think the analogy to rationalbasis review under constitutional law, though inexact, is useful.
82 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Housing Issues, in AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 142, 148.
83 See id.

84
See. e.g., Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that in some
instances a more searching "active" standard of review is used).
85 At least one federal court of appeals has read the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), to impose such a requirement on ERISA trustees. See
Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1992).
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claim for breach of fiduciary duty, but rather a standard tort claim (if the decision
was medical in nature) or breach of contract claim (if the decision was administrative
in nature). 86 For those decisions made in situations that truly involve the hybrid
managed care decision, such as the use of a gatekeeper function to limit access to
specialty care, the fiduciary model applies and the court should defer to the decision
only if the fiduciary can justify the decision as indicated above.
To be sure, the process we propose will not be a panacea and will not solve
problems immediately. Over time, standards and doctrine will emerge to provide
stability and fairness of process that will minimize the conflicts and provide adequate
redress for a breach of fiduciary duty. Our approach is consistent with M. Gregg
Bloche's argument that clinical loyalties may conflict with medicine's broader social
purposes (including issues of cost containment). 87 In this sense, the fiduciary duty
framework we outline represents "an ongoing effort to mediate, case by case, between
clinical fidelity and medicine's social purposes ...[this] conflict [is] in need of
ongoing management, rather than... a problem to be solved once and for all." 88
2.
Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One advantage of the fiduciary duty approach is the flexibility it gives the court
in crafting remedies where the plan fiduciary is found to have breached his or her
duties. At common law, a suit against a fiduciary would lie in equity, meaning that a
court could specify injunctive relief and command the fiduciary to undertake action
or undo past action. 89 In addition, the court could demand restitution of any
unwarranted gain to the fiduciary. 90 Violation of a fiduciary duty also gives rise to a
claim in tort, 91 meaning that the plaintiff could recover monetary damages resulting
from the breach where equitable relief could not remedy the injury. In many cases,
however, the proper remedy would be an injunction, which grants the court greater
discretion while at the same time encouraging private settlements and creative
solutions between beneficiaries and plan fiduciaries.
D.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FIDUCIARY MODEL

The above discussion suggests several general advantages of a fiduciary model.
A more explicit consideration follows.
First, as noted in Part II, neither contract nor tort law seems to offer an adequate
framework for resolving conflicts between individuals and populations.
The
inadequacy of these regimes demonstrates the desirability of finding an alternative
method. The concept of fiduciary duty, like tort and contract, is a fundamental legal
principle, underlying the law of both agency and trusts. 92 Yet the common-law
principles underlying the fiduciary relationship (as opposed to the law surrounding
86 See, e.g., Herdrich v. Pegram, 170 F.3d 683, 686 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that "[fliduciary duties are vital when contracts are
incomplete, but when a contract fully specifies proper behavior, then even a full-fledged trustee need
not (indeed, must not) depart from the contractual provisions that the settlor established."), Turner v.
Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting that "[t]he notion that
there is a fiduciary duty on Fallon's part to expend funds for treatment explicitly excluded from the
plan would be quite a stretch").
87 See Bloche, supra note 8, at 268.
88 Id. at 272.
89 See BOGERT, supra note 26, at 549-50.
90 See id. at 289.
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
92 See,

e.g.,

RESTATEMENT

responsibilities of an agent).

(SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 13 (1958)

(explaining the fiduciary
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ERISA fiduciaries) have not received much attention from courts or commentators as
a possible analytical framework for managed care law. 93
Second, since attorneys, physicians and health care administrators are trained to
understand the concept of fiduciary duty, they are more likely to be comfortable with
a regime that places fiduciary duties at the core of decisionmaking. In terms of the
relative ease of its implementation, a "new" alternative that is still rooted in
traditional common law concepts and doctrines may be easier to implement than a
truly radical or revolutionary approach. Also, the fiduciary duty concept is
indifferent to how health care is organized. Much of the current debate centers on
how managed care has changed the nature of the law-medicine interaction. The
centrality of fiduciary duties can remain stable even if the environment changes.
Fiduciary duties transcend the ways in which the health care system is organized.
Third, a model that focuses on fiduciary duty is practical because it harmonizes
well with the existing statutory regime governing managed care entities. As noted
above, ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on plan administrators toward plan
beneficiaries. 94 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated its belief that the common
law of trusts should inform courts' interpretation of the duty imposed by ERISA on
plan administrators. 95 Certainly, a fiduciary model cannot be justified merely by
relying on the fact that ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty. Indeed, we have offered a
normative rather than a positive analysis of the applicability of fiduciary duty to
demonstrate that a fiduciary model should direct the law in this area, rather than
merely to discuss whether it does. This normative evaluation bears on ERISA in that
it may highlight the advantages and shortcomings of the ERISA approach and also
may usefully describe the proper implications of ERISA's undefined imposition of a
fiduciary role on plan administrators.
Fourth, an analytical model rooted in an existing legal framework assures that
the courts can fulfill their traditional institutional role of monitoring and facilitating
social and economic arrangements. Courts have long been in the business of
reconciling or balancing conflicting policy objectives, particularly in situations like
managed care where an external check on free-market financial incentives is needed.
The courts must mediate relationships like those presented in the managed-care
situation, where the triad of providers, consumers and payors have interests that
sometimes overlap and conflict. As an institution, the judiciary is also able, and
likely, to establish stable doctrinal rules over time.
Equally important, a fiduciary-duty approach would enable the courts to render
better decisions or at least provide better justifications for the decisions they now
struggle to reach. A fiduciary-duty perspective allows courts to support the viability
of managed care as a method of cost containment. This perspective also avoids the
blunt instrument of contractual interpretation, which frequently produces the harsh
outcome of blanket denials, or tort, which has the potential to undermine managedcare cost containment innovations. In the realm of administrative law, a similar
regime of deference exists for agencies that can provide a basic record to support

93 Two commentators that have considered this approach are E. Haavi Morreim and Maxwell
Mehlman.

See generally Morreim, supra note 42; Mehlman, supra note 5 (discussing imposing the

obligations of a fiduciary upon health care organizations for the purposes of patient-related
decisionmaking and judicial review). Cf Hall & Anderson, supra note 46, at 1697-98 (discussing,
but quickly dismissing, the possibility of a "trust law model" for judicial review of decisions).
94 See supra Part III.B.
95 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
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their decisions. 96 Likewise, the fiduciary model vests initial decision-making
authority, and the power to create and evaluate a factual record, in a party with
expertise in the area, while also retaining an oversight role for the courts.
Fifth, a successful fiduciary model will reduce litigation. While the tort and
contract models rely on the courts to resolve conflicts, the fiduciary model creates a
structure to resolve these conflicts within the managed care system. This approach
offers the opportunity to reestablish relationships of trust between all the parties and
to focus on the ethical foundations of physicians' and institutions' fiduciary duties to
individual patients. 97 A fiduciary model places the physician-patient relationship at
the center of the clinical encounter, not at the periphery. The fiduciary concept
motivates all parties to talk about the same issue and to think about creative solutions
rather than to scream past one another.
One potential drawback to this framework is that requiring a detailed record of
the decision-making process will make that process itself more expensive, increasing
the overall cost of the plan. As a result, the fiduciary model would work only if there
was a concomitant decrease in the costs of litigation of disputed claims. This is a
testable empirical issue. It is worth noting that even if requiring a fiduciary process
increases administrative costs, it offers considerable public-relations benefits and
may reduce litigation.
V.

CONCLUSION-LAW AND MEDICINE AT THE MILLENNIUM

The antagonism between lawyers and doctors is not just about setting medical
practice standards or health policy. For much of the second half of the twentieth
century, attorneys and physicians vied for preeminence in social and economic status.
In fact, physicians supplanted attorneys in social and economic stature after World
War II, dominating health care delivery and health care policy, and achieving
preeminence in social status. 98 Since that time, these two professions have often
competed for position in defining the role of law in medicine and medicine in law.
One consequence of this on-going battle is an increasing level of mistrust between the
legal and medical professions, resulting in a dialogue that is more adversarial than
cooperative. Another consequence is that too much attention is devoted to what
divides the two professions, and too little reflection is dedicated to what the
professions have in common. Focusing on these similarities might serve to revive
better communication and cooperation.
What has been lost in recent years and must be reinvigorated, is a sense of what
the two professions have in common. Physicians and attorneys share a set of core
social and ethical values that help define them as professionals. For instance, they
share respect for the individual, the need to make case-by-case decisions under
uncertainty, and a commitment to reason, professional judgment and experience as
the basis for decisionmaking. 99 Both professions are also devoted to the betterment
of society, as well as the benefit of the client/patient. For the lawyer, there is a duty
96 See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977)
(deciding that where the FDA did not cite reasons for its regulation, the regulation was arbitrary and
invalid).
97 See Bloche, supra note 8, at 268-74; Mechanic, supra note 7, at 661.
98 For an excellent and comprehensive history of this transformation, see generally PAUL STARR,
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).

99 See David C. Hadorn, Emerging Parallels in the American Health Care and Legal-Judicial
Systems, 18 AM. J.L; & MED. 73, 75-76 (1992) (highlighting similarities in decisionmaking that the
legal and medical systems use, including structural and procedural aspects).
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to uphold the law, a core value that can impede the service of a client in rare
instances. 100 Physicians have corresponding responsibilities to social purposes such
as public health and non-health related social goals (e.g., military readiness or
criminal justice). 101 Finally, in many ways, from the legal profession's reliance on
medical expertise to establish cases in the courtroom, to medicine's trust in lawyers
for advice on appropriate practice, lawyers and doctors have arguably become
codependent.
The concept of fiduciary duty is particularly important in understanding the
professions' shared values. Perhaps the most common ethic to physicians and
lawyers is dedication to the individuals who seek their services. Professional
privilege, the confidentiality of a professional's relationship with patient or client, has
developed beyond being legally enforceable to become etched into societal, as well
as professional, expectations. The very integrity of the professions of law and
medicine requires that every member of the profession be able to maintain patient
trust and confidentiality. Physicians and lawyers are entrusted with protecting
different spheres of a person's being, the former with bodily integrity and the latter
with rights under law. These duties are elemental to the professions and are assumed
with the taking of oaths, upon graduation from medical school or admission to the
bar.
An important issue in the new millennium is the stimulation of a more
productive dialogue between the legal and medical professions. Given the recent
hostility and complexity of health care delivery, reconciliation will not be easy, even
though there is no preordained reason why law and medicine must remain
antagonists. To be sure, contentions over liability standards and the perceived
intrusion of the law into medical practice will remain a part of the relationship,
regardless of how health care delivery is organized in the future. For example, the
attorney's duty to represent his client creates the very adversarial tension that
animates malpractice litigation and sometimes makes it seem as though attorneys are
not interested in the search for scientific truth.
Nevertheless, the shared value of fiduciary duties offers an opportunity for a
mutual dialogue between the two groups. A stable health policy environment
depends on effective collaboration between law and medicine. Most observers are
likely to agree that continued antagonism between law and medicine is not helpful to
patients nor to formulating health policy. There may well be better ways of creating
an enduring dialogue than this approach, but there is no acceptable alternative to
reconciliation. Whether fiduciary duties will achieve the desired reconciliation
remains to be tested. At a minimum, it is a more promising approach than continued
reliance on tort or contract to mediate the interactions between physicians and
attorneys.

100 See id. at 79.
101 See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS 159 (1993); Bloche, supra note 8,

at 269.

